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Just over five years ago Carla Hills and I co-chaired a major independent task force, sponsored by the Council 
on Foreign Relations on U.S.-China relations1. We were not the first to observe, as we stated early in the 
report, ‘China is so large, populous and complex that almost anything one might assert about Chia is ‘true.’’ 
China was then, and remains now, a sprawling work in progress, developing at a pace and breadth that are 
unprecedented. It was, and still is, difficult to distill the essential trends from the mass of data, observations 
and anecdotal evidence. Five years on, it is worth revisiting the conclusions and recommendations of that task 
force, to determine if the events of recent years have given any cause to revise them. 
Our task force found much that was positive and encouraging about developments in China - the lifting of 
hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty, the determination not to repeat the excesses of the Mao era, 
the growing openness of many sectors of the society, a few nascent signs of participative government at the 
local level and an international policy of peaceful development. We also found much of concern - continued 
repression of political dissent, heavy-handed enforcements of social policies and growing international 
assertiveness punctuated by bouts of xenophobic nationalism. We recommended a blended set of policies 
towards China, with an emphasis on the positive. We called for continuing to do business with China, while 
encouraging it to improve performance on compliance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms and to shift 
to a consumption-led economy; we favored including China in both formal and informal international bodies 
to deal with common concerns from halting the spread of nuclear weapons to dealing with climate change 
to handling North Korea. At the same time, we recommended the maintenance of American alliances and its 
military capability to handle China’s rapidly growing naval and air capability off its coasts. 
During that five years since the publication of that task force report, China’s double-digit economic growth 
has continued, based on booming exports, continued foreign direct investment, and heavy capital spending 
on infrastructure. That economic performance was sustained despite a worldwide economic recession that 
sharply reduced growth in most other countries. Business by foreign companies in China has continued to 
grow, but has become more difficult, with the theft of intellectual property increasing, especially by cyber 
means, and corruption growing; China has cautiously increased its cooperation in international efforts to deal 
with Iran, and has sent more troops to UN peacekeeping missions, but its assertiveness in the South and East 
China seas has spiked. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Australia and the USA should focus on a blended policy of cooperation with China, along with an 
insistence on international norms, and maintenance of alliance and military strength. Regular evaluations 
of China’s shifting capacity and interests, to identify what issues are of rising or declining significance for 
Beijing will be needed to be effective in engaging China and building a better future for the region.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 5 years after a major report on US-China relations it’s worth revisiting our assessments.
•	 Most judgements remain valid, but some have changed significantly.
•	 Taiwan has moved from a primary issue to second order, though not forgotten.
•	 China’s regional assertiveness is concerning and should be examined closely.
•	 China’s economic development model has run its course; Beijing needs to provide leadership to 
usher in reform.
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Developments of the last five years have not provided 
support to those who would argue that as it becomes 
more prosperous, China is inevitably becoming a 
benevolent and trusted member of its region and the 
world; conversely, China has not provided conclusive 
support to those who claim that there has never 
been a fundamental change of global power without 
conflict, and that the world must either acquiesce to 
China’s rise or fight it. China’s development is dynamic, contradictory, and its future path is uncertain.
So the fundamental prescription of our task force five years ago remains valid - a blended policy of cooperation 
with China, along with insistence on international norms, and maintenance of alliance and military strength. 
However the events of the past five years can give us more detailed insights into the challenges and 
opportunities other countries face in applying those policy recommendations effectively. Three major sets of 
developments have been the most important: the China-Taiwan relationship; China’s assertiveness with its 
neighbors: and China’s domestic economic weaknesses.
One of the most striking developments of the past five years has been China-Taiwan relations. Five years ago 
Taiwan was the single most important factor in the US-China relationship, and had been so for the previous 
decade. However Ma Ying-jeou’s election in 2008 started a new era in China-Taiwan relations. President 
Ma’s predecessors had tested the limits of both the Taiwanese electorate’s support for and the Chinese 
government’s tolerance of steps towards independence. It was clear that the Taiwanese people were more 
interested in practical steps towards better relationships with China than they were in symbolic gestures that 
antagonized it. On the other hand, China had learned that heavy-handed attempts to intimidate the Taiwanese 
people with military demonstrations, to blackmail Taiwanese businesses and endorse specific parties and 
candidates, were counterproductive. Both sides were ready for a new phase in their relations, and President 
Ma’s policy of the ‘three no’s’ (no unification, no independence and no use of force) provided a sound basis 
for a fresh start. Since then China and Taiwan have made steady progress on a series of agreements in 
transportation, financial and cultural links that have removed many of the impediments to much greater 
business and personal contact across the Taiwan Strait. It is striking how Taiwan has moved from the central 
place in China’s international concerns to a secondary position. Before 2008 the first half hour of any meeting 
of a foreign leader with a Chinese official would be devoted to a Taiwan; now there are meetings in which the 
subject never comes up.
However this absence of the barking dog is less reassuring than it seems. The issue of sovereignty between 
Taiwan and China has been postponed, not resolved. According to polling data, the citizens of Taiwan are less 
and less thinking of themselves as Chinese, and fewer every year actually believe that they are part of ‘one 
China’. They have no desire to cede to Beijing the influence that, for example, the citizens of Hong Kong have 
been forced to accept. China, as it grows in economic and military power, increasingly believes that others, 
especially Taiwan, will have to bend to its will and China in future will probably be less willing to concede to 
Taiwan a de jure recognition of the de facto autonomy it now enjoys. Taiwan, for its part, is probably willing to 
put off any discussion of the issue indefinitely, but China is not. The other countries in the region need to be 
thinking through the actions they would take should the China-Taiwan relationship heat back up and resume 
center stage in China’s external strategy. Better yet, the countries in the region should be thinking through a 
more positive approach than waiting and hoping.
If the Taiwan issue was surprisingly quiet over the last five years, China’s relationships with its neighbors in 
the South China Sea and in the East China Sea were surprisingly confrontational. In the chapter on ‘China’s 
Approach to the World’ our task force report included the South China Sea in a Chinese ‘Zone of Peace’ and 
we were optimistic about continued improvements in Japan-China relations. What happened?
“ Taiwan has moved from the central 
place in China’s international concerns 
to a secondary position. ”
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The Chinese claim that it was more aggressive pressing of their territorial claims in the South China Sea by 
Vietnam and the Philippines, in particular, that derailed the peaceful progress of prior years. They claim that 
it was Japanese actions in the Senkakus (or Diaoyus, as the Chinese call them) - arrest of a Chinese fishing 
boat captain and the purchase of the islands themselves by the Japanese government - that upped the ante 
there. Most other countries claim that it was China’s more aggressive military and diplomatic actions to push its 
claims that caused the cycle of confrontation and crisis of the past several years. However it started, the cycle 
of military deployments — fortunately to date all shows of force rather than uses of force — diplomatic claims 
and intense media focus in all countries, has now been firmly established.
China’s behaviour during this period, however, has 
been a rude shock to those who believed that its 
commitment to peaceful development was absolute. 
In Southeast Asia in particular, China’s economic and 
diplomatic strategy had been generally admired as 
masterful. It used access to its own import market 
for influence with more advanced countries like 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and generous 
development projects for the poorer countries like 
Cambodia and Laos. It sent skilled diplomats to 
ambassadorial posts who presented the most benign possible picture of China’s intentions and actions. In 
2002 it had signed a declaration of principles for the settlement of maritime disputes in the South China Sea 
that renounced the use of force in favor of negotiated peaceful settlements.
“ China’s behaviour has been a rude 
shock to those who believed its 
commitment to peaceful development 
was absolute. ”
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Yet in July of 2010 another face of China showed itself at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, 
as foreign minister Yang Jiechi lectured his fellow diplomats in strident tones, ‘China is a big country and 
other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.’ For months previously, Chinese diplomats had been 
telling their interlocutors that its maritime claims in the South China Sea - and those claims extended down to 
Indonesia - constituted a ‘core interest’ of China, that is, an interest on the level of Taiwan and Tibet. Several 
factors, it seems, formed this different and more aggressive Chinese approach. At the heart of it seemed to be 
a Chinese idea that rather than its interests and ambitions being stable and limited, they grew commensurately 
with Chinese relative power. By 2010 China had not only weathered the world economic recession, but had 
assisted other Asian countries to do so also. That recession, which had spread to much of the world, had been 
started by the United States, and the United States and Western Europe had not yet recovered from it. China’s 
GDP had surpassed Japan’s and predictions of the date of its overtaking the United States were shortening. 
Much of China’s military buildup had gone into its Navy and Air Force units in the south, where the South China 
Sea was their operating area. The Chinese acted as if this greater economic and military power in Southeast 
Asia meant that other countries owed them new concessions on old issues. 
The reaction of China’s neighbors was to band together to oppose Chinese demands, to increase their defense 
spending and acquisitions, and to turn to the United States for support. Seeing this reaction, China seemed to 
realize that it had overplayed its hand. State Councillor Dai Bingguo published an authoritative article reiterating 
China’s commitment to peaceful development, President Hu Jintao on his January 2011 trip to the United 
States did the same in all his public statements, and the immediate crisis passed. However the memories of 
2010 remain vivid in the minds of China’s neighbors. In addition, Chinese military deployments in both the 
South China Sea and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have increased and targeted economic measures 
against the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam have continued. Yang Jeichi has replaced Dia Bingguo as State 
Councillor. These episodes of the past several years reinforce the recommendations in our task force report 
to maintain alliances and military strength in the Asia-Pacific region. This military strength has not been used 
for offensive purposes by the United States and its allies since the end of the Vietnam War, but it provides the 
incentive for peaceful negotiation of differences in the region and the capability to resist Chinese enlargement of 
its core interests.
Economic developments of the last five years are perhaps the most significant of all. Behind the impressive 
overall numbers problems are arising. China’s economic growth began in 1979 when it decided to open to the 
rest of the world. It followed the path already blazed by its neighbors in Asia - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong - freeing the private sector of the economy, welcoming foreign investment, exporting 
manufactured goods, and investing in infrastructure. This formula worked well, resulting in roughly 10% GDP 
growth rates, moving hundreds of millions of China’s citizens out of poverty, and providing a justification for 
its continuing grip on power for the Chinese Communist Party, which had abandoned both its ideological 
justification and its responsibility to provide planned and reliable jobs, goods and social services to its citizens.
However it has become clear to thoughtful Chinese in the last few years that the economic development model 
of the past thirty years has run its course. It has resulted in income inequality and corruption that are among the 
highest in the world, and major sources of domestic discontent. It has resulted in damage to the environment 
- foul air in major cities and polluted rivers in many regions - that arouses citizen anger and calls for action. 
The foundations of sustaining the old model have been undermined. Wages are rising rapidly throughout the 
country, adding to the cost of exports; import markets in the developed world are shrinking, and aggressive 
Chinese polices of indigenous innovation, protection of a low exchange rate for its currency and use of punitive 
economic measures for political purposes are provoking backlash in its former export markets. Capital 
expenditures on infrastructure, a major component of GDP growth in the past, have exhausted their purpose 
and are not productive any longer. Despite the gains of the past, there are more Chinese below the poverty line 
today than there were in 1979, when the current burst of development began. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Australia and the USA should focus on a blended policy of cooperation with China, along with an 
insistence on international norms, and maintenance of alliance and military strength. Regular evaluations 
of China’s shifting capacity and interests, to identify what issues are of rising or declining significance for 
Beijing will be needed to be effective in engaging China and building a better future for the region.
1  Carla A. Hills, Dennis C. Blair & Frank Sampson Jannuzzi U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course  
(New York: 2007) Council on Foreign Relations
In the face of all these imperatives for change, the Chinese political leadership system has grown more 
conservative, careful and slow. It relies on consensus, and the circle of those who must give their consent to 
major policy decisions represents entrenched political and economic interests in the country with large stakes 
in the current system. It is difficult to imagine that another Deng Xiaoping, or even another Zhu Rongji could 
emerge with the personal stature and authority to take the unpopular decisions that are needed to shift to a 
consumption-based economy with a private sector that is growing again, much less to institute the democratic 
reforms that would root out corruption and inequality in the party itself and in the country. The Xi Jinping 
government shows no sign of being able to do so.
What happens within the economy and domestic governance of China will be the most important indicator of 
the course of its future, and those of us in countries that deal with China should watch closely. The safe bet is 
that China will muddle through in the near future, with reduced but still significant economic growth and slow 
progress on its many problems. A dramatic shift to consumption-based economic growth and strengthening 
of more open media and social communication and the independent rule of law would be welcome; greater 
repression to control instability resulting from continued high levels of inequality, corruption, pollution and lower 
levels of growth would keep Chinese leadership attention focused at home, but would be bad for the Chinese 
people, with the potential for domestic violence and tension in the region. 
In conclusion, the last five years of Chinese developments have reinforced the importance of a blended policy 
for other countries dealing with China: an emphasis on continued engagement with China to cooperate on 
common challenges and to follow international norms of financial and commercial practices; but also strong 
bonds with traditional allies and maintenance of military capability. The Chinese themselves will decide their 
future, and the limited influence that other countries can bring to bear should favor a better future for the region, 
but have the resilience to handle adverse developments. 
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